The aggregate signer outputs one signature through the aggregate signature algorithm, and the aggregate signature verifier confirms that multiple users have signed through the aggregate signature verification algorithm. Due to the high signature efficiency and low requirements for broadband, the aggregate signature scheme is widely studied and applied. For most aggregate signature schemes based on the traditional cryptography, key escrow is very complicated, while for identity-based aggregate signature schemes, there is a problem with certificate management.
Introduction
The concept of aggregate signature was proposed by Boneh et al. [1] . Its idea is that multiple users can sign multiple messages, that these signatures are output by the aggregate signer through the aggregate signature algorithm as one signature and that the aggregate signature verifier then confirms whether multiple users have signed through the aggregate signature verification algorithm. The aggregate signature can improve the efficiency of signature verification and at the same time save bandwidth. With the development of cryptography, aggregate signature schemes based on various cryptography theories have been proposed. [2] proposed an sequential aggregate scheme based on the trapdoor permutation theory. Based on [1] , [3] proposed a new aggregate signature security model. Since Shamir proposed the identity-based public key cryptography [4] , many applied researches have been carried out on the identity-based cryptosystem scenarios, and a large number of identity-based aggregate schemes [5] [6] [7] have also been proposed. But these identity-based aggregate signature schemes have problems in certificate management and key escrow.
Certificateless public key cryptosystem was proposed by AL-Riyami and Paterson [8] in 2003 to effectively address the key escrow problem in the identity-based cryptosystem and reduce the complexity of certificate storage and management in the certificate-based public key system. Gong et al. [9] introduced the certificateless idea into aggregate signature for the first time and designed a certificateless aggregate signature security model. Subsequently, certificateless aggregate signature schemes with various attributes were presented, mainly trying to improve the computation efficiency and guarantee security. In the certificateless aggregate signature algorithm proposed by Zhang et al. [10] , with the increase in the number of signers, the aggregate signature will become longer and the amount of computation required for verification of the aggregate signature is also increased. Although Zhang et al. later improved the original scheme [11] , the partial private key generated by the key generation center (KGC) for each signer requires two group elements, reducing its efficiency, and for the aggregate signature, users need to use a uniform clock, which is difficult to achieve in practice. In order to improve the efficiency of aggregate signature, Xiong et al. [12] designed a new certificateless aggregate signature scheme. However, this scheme was proved by SHEN et al. [13] in the same year to be insecure against Type II attacks. Afterwards, Zhang et al. [14] analyzed the security of the previous certificateless aggregate signature scheme. In order to resist malicious-but-passive KGC attacks, they proposed two improved schemes. Luo et al. [15] studied and analyzed the two schemes, and after careful design of the attack, they proved that the second scheme could not resist the attacks by two kinds of attackers and put forward an improved scheme.
He et al. [16] also gave a new attack pattern for the certificateless aggregate signature scheme proposed by Xiong et al. and proposed an improved scheme. In this paper, we analyze the security of the scheme proposed by He et al. and find that this scheme cannot resist forgery
attacks, and then we analyze the reason for such successful attacks and propose two more secure certificateless aggregate signature scheme. We take the second scheme as an example and prove that the improved scheme is unforgeable in the random oracle model. Compared with other similar schemes, the second scheme proposed requires less computation and is more suitable for use in many-to-one communication systems, especially in the smart grid aggregate signature scenarios.
Preliminaries
This section is the basis for the research on certificateless aggregate signature schemes. It consists of four parts -bilinear pairing, mathematical problem, composition of the certificateless aggregate signature system and security model. The common preconditions for the four parts are as follows.
Condition 1: let G1 be an additive group of prime order q. P is a generator of G1.
Condition 2: let G2 be a multiplicative group of prime order q.
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Based on Condition 1 and 2, U and V are two elements of G1. e is a map of G1×G1→G2. If e is a bilinear pairing, the following three conditions must hold.
(1) Non-degeneracy: e(U, V)≠1.
(2) Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(U, V). 
Composition of the certificateless aggregate signature system
The certificateless aggregate signature system has four roles -trusted KGC, signer, aggregate signer and aggregate signature verifier, and the system consists of 7 algorithms.
(1 2) Generation of the system master key and public key. KGC randomly uses s∈Zq * as the system master key and computes Ppub=sP as the system public key.
3) Generation of the system foundation platform parameter. KGC generates params=(q, G1,
G2, e, P, Ppub, H1, H2, H3).
(2) Generation of the partial private key by KGC: input the user's identity IDi, system parameter params and the master key s. KGC computes Qi= H1(IDi) and di = sQi; the user's partial private key di is sent to the user in a secure form.
(3) Setting of user's secret value: input system foundation platform parameter params and the user's identity IDi; output a random numberof the user's secret value xi∈Zq * , saved by user; a user's public key PKi=xiP, sent by the user to KGC.
(4) Setting of the private and public keys: input the user's partial private key di , the user's secret valuexi and the user's public key PKi; output a private key pair saved by the user (di, xi) and the public key PKi exposed by KGC.
(5) Signature: input system foundation platform parameter params, identity IDi, private key pair (di, xi), public key PKi and message mi; output a piece of signature information σi..
1)
Randomly select ri∈Zq * and computes Ui=riP.
3) Signature σi = (Ui, Vi).
(6) Aggregate signature: input the messages and signature information of n senders (IDi, mi, PKi, σi) (1≤i≤n); the aggregator outputs one aggregate signature σ through the following steps.
2) Check the signatures sent by users to see if e(P, Vi) = e(ki PKi, Q)e(Ppub, Qi+hiUi). If it
holds, then, go to 3) to carry out the aggregate signature operation; otherwise, terminate the algorithm and reject the aggregate signature.
3) Compute 
Analysis on the Security of the Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme
Proposed by He et al.
In [16] , He et al. claimed the scheme was unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message, chosen identity and public key replacement attacks. In this section, we use a concrete attack to prove that this scheme is not unforgeable under Type II attacks.
Suppose User A and User B are the sender and the receiver, respectively. A's private key is (dA, skA) and its public key is PKA. The attacker A2 impersonates Aand forges the valid message by taking the following steps.
(1) Preparation for forgery: according to the previous signature information that A sends to B σA = (U ' A, V ' A) and m ' A, A2 calculates the interim parameter that can participate in forging signature
so A2 can successfully obtain the interim parameter that participates in the signature forgery Proof: The signature generated can pass the verification by the aggregator.
From this, it can be seen that if the KGC attacker A2 can forge a user's invalid signature through the forging algorithm, it can also forge the invalid signatures of multiple users through the forging algorithm, and the aggregate verifier will also accept the aggregate signature through aggregate operations.
The above analysis shows that the aggregator verifies the authenticity of the sender'
signature by e(P ,Vi) = e(Ppub, Qi+hiUi) e(ki PKi, Q). As e(Ppub, Qi+hiUi) e(ki PKi, Q)= e(P ,di+shiUi+ ki xiQ), for the attacker A2, the only element unknown to him/her is xi, but through observation and analysis, we can see that xiQ is a definite value in the signature process.
According to Vi =di+shiUi+ ki xiQ, on condition that A2 can acquire the message mi publicly sent by the user and the signature information Vi and Ui, A2 can calculate ki and hi, and then calculate xiQ according to ki -1 (Vi -di -hisUi). So the attacker A2 can arbitrarily forge the user's signature with the definite value xiQ.
Improvements of the Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme Proposed by He et al.
In order to resist A2's attack, we either break the composition relations between xi and other parameters that forms the definite value, or make the composition relations unsolvable. In this section, we propose two improved schemes which modify the signature and the aggregate signature verification algorithms respectively to resist A2's attack.
Improved Scheme 1
In order to break the composition relations between xi and other parameters that forms the definite value, we build a certificateless aggregate signature scheme, in which 4 algorithms -the KGC setup (generation of the system master key and the public key and generation of system foundation platform parameter), generation of the partial private key, setting of user's secret value and setting of the private and public keys -are the same as in the scheme proposed by He et al.. We improve 4 algorithms including the preparation for setup in setup, signature, aggregate signature and aggregate signature verification. 
After the above changes are made, the variable Ki will vary with the value of Ui in the session, so that the xiKi in each session will no longer be a definite value to prevent the forgery of , the bilinear pairing computation will increase with the increasing number of users, reducing the computation efficiency.
Improved Scheme 2
In order to make the composition relations between xi and other parameters that forms the definite value unsolvable, we construct a certificateless aggregate signature scheme, where 4 algorithms -the KGC setup (generation of the system master key and the public key and generation of system foundation platform parameter), generation of the partial private key, setting of user's secret value and setting of the private and public keys -are the same as in the scheme proposed by He et al.. We improve 4 algorithms including the preparation for setup in setup, signature, aggregate signature and aggregate signature verification. After the above changes are made, ri in each session is randomly generated, which is unknown to the attacker, so hiriT is also unknown and the value of each session is different. Even if the attacker A2 acquires the message mi publicly sent by the user, and calculates ki and hi based on Vi and Ui, he/she still cannot solve xiQ=ki -1 (Vi -di -hiriT). This improvement can prevent the attacker A2 from forging Vi, and during the aggregate signature verification process, the bilinear pairing computation will not increase with the increasing number of users, indicating that the computation efficiency is high.
Analysis on the Security and Efficiency of Improved Scheme 2
As we already indicate in Section 5.1 that the first improved scheme is inefficient, in this section, we only analyze the security and efficiency of the second improved scheme.
Correctness
Theorem 2. The second improved scheme is correct.
Proof: For the second scheme, two correctness verifications need to be done.
(1) The aggregator verifies the correctness of users' signatures 
Unforgeability
Theorem 3. In the random oracle model, if a Type I attacker A1 can successfully attack the second improved scheme proposed in this paper with a non-negligible probability, there must exist an algorithm F that can solve the CDHP with a non-negligible probability in polynomial time. Ppub=aP. C sends params=(q, G1, G2, e, P, Ppub, H1, H2, H3) Query on the generation of user keys: F builds the public and private key (IDi, PKi, xi) list.
Setup: F computes
When A1 makes a query on IDi to F. If there is a record of IDi in the list, F sends the public and private key values of IDi to A1; otherwise, F randomly selects xi∈Zq * as the private key of IDi, computes the public key PKi= xiP, and adds it in the public and private key list.
Query on the partial private key: F builds the partial private key (IDi, PKi, di) list. When A1 makes a query on IDi to F: 1) If IDi≠IDj, it turns to the query on H1, and sends the value of di queried to A1.
2) If IDi= IDj, it terminates the algorithm.
Public key query: when A1 makes a query on IDi to F, randomly selects xi∈Zq * as the private key of IDi, computes the public key PKi= xiP, and records it in the public and private key list.
Public key replacement query: when A1 makes a query on IDi to F, A1 first selects PKi to replace the public key of IDi, and then A1 sends the public and private key (IDi, PKi, xi) list to F.
F adds it to the public and private key list.
Signature query: A1 makes a query on (m, IDi, PKi) to F. If IDi≠IDj, F calculates σi = (Ui, Vi)
according to the signature algorithm proposed in this paper, adds it to the appropriate list and sends the result to A1; otherwise, F terminates the algorithm.
If F does not return "⊥" in the query process, we obtain the following equations. 
F obtains an instance of solving abP. If A1 successfully forges the signature, then F can utilize A1 to obtain a solution to CDHP. To avoid this situation, the probability of the adversary A1 encountering failure in the query on partial private key should be at least 
Theorem 4.
In the random oracle model, if a Type Ⅱ attacker A2 can successfully attack the second improved scheme proposed in this paper with a non-negligible probability, there must exist an algorithm F that can solve the CDHP with a non-negligible probability in polynomial time.
Setup: F computes Ppub=sP. C sends params=(q, G1, G2, e, P, Ppub, H1, H2, H3) to A2. according to the signature algorithm proposed in this paper, adds it to the appropriate list and sends the result to A2; otherwise, F terminates the algorithm.
F obtains an instance of solving abP. If A2 successfully forges the signature, then F can utilize A2 to obtain a solution to CDHP. To avoid this situation, the probability of the adversary A2 encountering failure in the query on partial private key should be at least
, where qx is the number of queries made on the partial private key. So, in polynomial time, F should have at least an advantage of ε in solving CDHP. Therefore, the second improved scheme proposed in this paper can resist the adaptive chosen-message attacks from the adversary A2 in the random oracle model.
Comparison with Other Similar Cases in Security
From Table 1 Comparison between Certificateless Aggregate Signature Schemes in Security, we can see that: in terms of resistance against forgery attacks of random users, [14] has been proved in [15] that it cannot resist such attacks. [18] is also vulnerable to the forgery attacks of random users. All other schemes can resist Type I attacks. In terms of Type Ⅱ attacks, [12] and [17] have been proved to be insecure against Type Ⅱ attacks. [16] is analyzed in this paper and proved that it is not unforgeable. Therefore, the second improved scheme proposed in this paper is more secure than other similar schemes.
Tab.1. Comparison between Similar Schemes in Security Scheme
Type I Type Ⅱ Security Reference [17] √ × Insecure Reference [12] √ × Insecure Reference [16] √ × Insecure Reference [14] × × Insecure Reference [18] × × Insecure This paper √ √ Secure
Efficiency analysis
We measure the efficiency of a scheme by its computation amount. Suppose n stands for the number of users participating in the signcryption, P stands for 1 bilinear pairing operation, and M stands for the scalar multiplication. Based on the analysis of [3] , the bilinear pairing is much larger than the scalar multiplication. Table 2 shows the comparison between similar schemes in computation amount. For the current certificateless aggregate signature schemes, we compare the time of the bilinear pairing operation in the aggregate signature and aggregate signature verification algorithms. [17] is the most efficient one, requiring only 2 operations. Then it is [12] and [16] , requiring 3. Other schemes and the second improved scheme proposed in this paper require 4 operations. However, in terms of security, [17] , [12] and [16] are all insecure, as shown in Table 1 . Other schemes are compared by the time of scalar multiplication. [19] requires 5, [14] , [18] , [15] and [20] require 6 and the second improved scheme proposed in this paper requires only 4. Based on the above analysis, the scheme proposed in this paper is more efficient.
Tab.2. Comparison between Similar Schemes in Computation Amount
Scheme Aggregate signcryption
Aggregate signcryption verification
Total amount of computation Security
Reference [17] nM 2P+2nM 2P+3nM Insecure Reference [12] 2nM 3P+2nM 3P+4nM Insecure Reference [16] 2nM 3P+2nM 3P+4nM Insecure Reference [14] 4nM 4P+2nM 4P+6nM Insecure Reference [18] 4nM 4P+2nM 4P+6nM Insecure Reference [19] 3nM 4P+2nM 4P+5nM Secure Reference [15] 4nM 4P+2nM 4P+6nM Secure Reference [20] 4nM 4P+2nM 4P+6nM Secure This paper 2nM 4P+2nM 4P+4nM Secure
Conclusion
In this paper, in the security model of certificateless aggregate signature, we construct a concrete attack method to prove the scheme proposed by He et al. is not unforgeable against Type II attacks. By bonding the hash function with the public key information, we design two improved certificateless aggregate signature schemes with strong security. One is to break the composition relations between the secret value and other parameters, and the other is to make the composition relations of the definite value unsolvable. In the random oracle model, we prove the second improved scheme to be unforgeable and its security is equivalent to solving hard mathematical problems. Compared with the current similar schemes, the second improved scheme requires less computation. We take the aggregate signature for the smart grid as an example and introduce the improved scheme into the aggregate signature scenario. The test results show that the scheme can ensure security and at the same time achieve real-time data transmission.
